Catholic-ometer: 4 of 5
Enjoyability: 3.5 of 5
In the past, I've said that in some of his works, C.S. Lewis almost seems like a professional philosopher, while in others, he clearly comes across as more of a popularizer. This book, I'm afraid, is of the latter type. I say this, not because it's a bad book (it deals quite well with all the major problems people have concerning pain,) but because it's non-technical and contains some errors.
There's nothing wrong with using a book to popularize very basic responses to very basic arguments (rest assured, this kind of content is as much as [perhaps more than] most internet atheists will be able to grasp on these issues,) but if you're a really educated seeker, really looking for answers to life's tough questions, or a theology student who wants to know the truth, or even just a philosophically-minded person who's not entirely on board with Christianity yet, put this book down. In fact, even if you -are- entirely on board with Christianity, there's a chance this book might damage your faith.
Now, as I said, this book is a good book. Rest assured, I got just as many really good quotes from it as I did bad ones. That said, there -were- bad ones, and they came in two varieties. The first variety was weak and illogical arguments in favor of true positions. The second was defending very questionable, or even clearly-false positions.
At this point, I feel the need to remind you that I am not an atheist. I'm an orthodox Roman Catholic, so when I say a position is questionable, I mean either that it has been denounced by the church, or else not affirmed by them in any way (not respected in doctrine, discipline, practice, creed or prayers.) However, my objections to some of Lewis' conclusions will not exist in a vacuum. I will back up my position with evidence, and a noteworthy, talented apologist like C.S. Lewis deserves, I feel, no less.
First, however, let me cover the weak defenses of true positions. Fortunately, I only spotted two of these.
Firstly, in chapter 6, paragraph 12, he responds to the well-known Euthyphro dilemma. The dilemma is "does God command things because they're right, or are they right because he commands them? If he commands them because they're right, then that 'rightness' must have a source other than God. If they're right because he commands them, then 'right' and 'wrong' are arbitrarily dependant on the will of God."
Lewis' response to this dilemma is correct. He says that God commands things -because- they're right. What he does not do is explain how this can happen without "rightness" originating outside of God; namely, that it is God's nature, not his will, where right and wrong originate, and his will obeys his nature in commanding right things.
Chapter 6, paragraph 18; Lewis wants to prove that pain can be good for people, and cites the claim that old people generally, in his experience, grow better with age, not worse. However, age is not pain, and it brings many things with it other than pain. Sometimes, for example, it brings wisdom, which is much more likely than pain alone to improve a person's character. I think his claim that pain can be good for people is spot-on, but this argument is horribly wanting.
More importantly, however, he makes a number of claims which I think are simply wrong, and which certainly aren't required for Catholics (or indeed, Christians of any sort) to believe. He keeps going back to these too, so I'll describe these faulty teachings first, then point out where I saw them surfacing.
1. Competition is a form of evil.
This may not be intentional, but in Ch2Par14, he says that "hostility and competition" are a "grave evil." Gee. Should I have confessed my last game of chess to a priest?
I'm sorry. I don't mean to be snide about this, but only one kind of competition is evil; the hostile kind. If C.S. Lewis believes this (and I have no reason to think he does not,) the word "hostility" need not have been followed by anything.
2. The self-depreciation of the saints is "scientifically" accurate.
Ch4Par15. No, it's not. Science is about measurements, and how rotten you are is not measurable by any method of which we are aware.
3. God -causes- evil and suffering efficiently.
He doesn't use these precise words, but he does seem to imply that God is the cause of evil in Ch6Par8. He also, in the same place, implies that the human will is evil, but that's a separate problem.
4. The human will is evil, just by being a will.
I really don't know why he would say this, since he elsewhere rejects Total Depravity (which I also reject.) However, he seems to repeatedly confuse -evil- will with any kind of human will considered as a whole. In Ch6Par3, he rails at the very idea of desiring anything for the self, and advocates ruthlessly shattering such desires by force. However, the problem is that a person who -really- desired nothing for the self would also have no reason to associate with other human beings, since they wouldn't desire to be noble or virtuous, which is absurd. Of course these desires are valid. So are many other desires, provided they're kept in the proper order.
In Ch7Par3, he again demonstrates a fundamental confusion between the will, considered absolutely, and the will to do diabolical things.
This Error seems to feed into another one; his incorrect understanding of Heaven, which I will deal with in a moment.
5. Free will and its associated dangers are needed in order for people to live.
Ch2Par15. I agree that free will is needed in order for people to live, but its dangers are not required, or else, it would be impossible for Heaven to exist, since people clearly live there, yet, without danger.
6. Even if there were pains in Heaven, those in the know would desire them.
Ch8Par9. I don't think he quite understands the purpose of Heaven in saying this. The purpose of Heaven is to be in the closest possible proximity to God. To be in the closest possible proximity to God is to have all good things, and no evil things. However, pain is an evil thing, in and of itself (which I think may be another point of confusion for him.) Therefore, merely having pain proves that one is not in the closest possible proximity to God, and therefore, not in Heaven.
Believe me, after all we humans have suffered (self-inflicted or no,) a partial victory on an -eternal- scale would never be sufficient, and God knows this. That's why Purgatory doesn't last forever.
7. In Heaven, there is no beer.
More or less. He claims that no one can possess anything in Heaven. Then what, may I ask, is the point of giving up the things that we clearly -do- possess? This is a poor substitute, if true, and I'm fully convinced that it's false on that basis alone.
Still, I want to fully examine the points he makes on the subject.
Ch10Par5; he seems to recognize that this claim imperils the parable of the pearl of great price (the first objection I would have brought up,) but doesn't really deal with the issue, except to assert that what he's speaking of is "not an experience."
This requires an analysis of what the word "experience" means. An experience, in a broad sense, is anything which is perceptible, but is still a particular instance, and is therefore not obtainable, since it ceases to occur once the experience is past. However, a "particular instance" could, in theory, be stretched out into eternity, and therefore remain an experience, while still being imperishable. However, it would not be obtainable. This seems to be the common thread. Experiences are not obtainable things, and obtainable things are more than mere experiences.
Now, rewards come in two types; either obtainable rewards, such as money or candy, or else experiences, such as a vacation, or a trip to the fair. By merely saying that something is "not an experience," we imply that it is more than a mere perceptible, or even participative occurrance, whether or not it is experienced. We therefore imply that it is something which can be possessed. In other words, this paragraph contains a self-contradiction which disproves his claim.
Ch10Pars7, 9 and 10. Lewis quotes the theologia germanica, which is not doctrine, and heavily inspired Martin Luther, to try to support his claim that not only is there no ownership in Heaven, but no human will either. This, I think, ties into error #4. The theologia germanica contained several questionable claims, and this; the denial of the will of the saints, was one of the big ones. It said outright that the saints in Heaven have no will except for the will of God, but I reject this claim for one simple reason.
If this were true, asking the saints to intercede for us at the throne of God would be a wasted effort, since they would have no will to respond with. Now, you could say that the will of the saints does not -conflict- with the will of God, but that's not the claim that C.S. Lewis makes. He seems to have something of a mad-on for human wills and human selves, since he apparently wants both to be annihilated (the will being the highest function of the soul.) He even claims that human beings can only fulfill themselves completely by repeatedly giving up everything they are. I assume I don't need to point out that this is a self-contradiction, and therefore, necessarily false.
But the real question is why? Why hold onto this notion of the self and the will being evil in and of themselves? Why claim that anything which God made is evil? Why not claim, with the Church, Saint Thomas Aquinas, myself, and others, that everything which God made is essentially good, but tainted by sin? Well, it seems to me that Lewis' reason is somewhat evident...
Ch10Par1: "Heaven offers nothing that a mercenary soul can desire."
C.S. Lewis, it seems, either does not believe, or does not want people in Heaven who are only -imperfectly- penitent for their sins.
Let me explain what this means. In Catholic doctrine, we define two types of penitence. -Perfect- penitence, in which you're sorry for your sins because you know you've offended God, and don't wish to, and -imperfect- penitence, in which you're sorry for your sins because you're afraid of being punished (like, with the loss of goods or rewards.)
It seems that Mr. Lewis wants to make the point that the Christian God is not morally-inferior to anyone, because he rejects those who do his will out of ulterior motives, but this is problematic for four main reasons.
1. It's contrary to Church teaching, and therefore false.
2. It's contrary to the words of the apostle Paul, who said, in his letter to the Romans, that God will give to each person according to what he has -done.- Not according to his motives for doing it.
3. It does not, in fact, make God seem morally-superior, but rather, morally-inferior for not showing mercy on those who tried to please him, without really understanding the best reasons why they should.
4. I can only imagine how many modern men may have read these words and said to themselves "forget this. If this is the best deal I can get out of Christianity, I'm better off being an atheist." A mere two years ago, I'd have said the same.
The fact is that no matter how much certain Christians may want to thumb their noses at regular Joe Christian for following God, not out of selflessness, but because he wants a happy ending, you're much, much, -much,- better off not doing so. Jesus didn't say that people needed perfect contrition in order to enter Heaven. He said people needed faith and humility, and that they needed to be baptised, eat his body, drink his blood, take up their cross... You know... Catholic stuff.
Just living this way involves a massive degree of sacrifice, to the point where there are days that only the promise of that happy ending gets us through. This is the kind of understanding of the relationship between this life and the next that Jesus preached. He didn't claim that God would force people out for not having a perfect motive, or that dangers and life were one and the same, or that God would lobotomize the saints of their human will. Our Lord wasn't nearly so grim as all that.
He said that any man who has given up lands/cattle/wife/mother/father/etc... for his sake would receive (implying ownership) much more in the age to come.
When you think about it, that's a darn good deal, and I wonder why so many otherwise-holy people want to spoil that.
Again, this review may have come across as just a load of griping. I'm sorry if it seemed that way. It's only because these are complex issues, and they take a while to explain. As I said at the beginning, this book is more than half right. Its missteps are few and far between, but they do exist. Just keep your eyes open and proceed with caution, and you'll do just fine. You might even learn a thing or two about the problem of evil and how to approach it. Just don't take all of it at face value.
No comments:
Post a Comment